The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy*

The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in
Deliberative Democracy*

Jane Mansbridge with James Bohman, Simone Chambers,
David Estlund, Andreas Føllesdal, Archon Fung,
Cristina Lafont, Bernard Manin and José luis Martí

I. THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL REFORMULATED
DELIBERATIVE democracy has traditionally been defined in opposition to
self-interest, to bargaining and negotiation, to voting, and to the use of
power. Our assessment differs in two ways from the traditional one. First,
we contend that self-interest, suitably constrained, ought to be part of the
deliberation that eventuates in a democratic decision. Indeed, some forms of
negotiation involving self-interest meet all of our criteria for ideal deliberation, in
particular the criterion that in their ideal form deliberative methods eschew
coercive power. We thus include such constrained self-interest and these forms of
negotiation in our reformulation of the deliberative ideal, that is, the regulative
standard to which real deliberations should aspire. Second, we argue for a
complementary rather than antagonistic relation of deliberation to many
democratic mechanisms that are not themselves deliberative. These non-
deliberative mechanisms, such as aggregation through voting as well as fair
bargaining and negotiation among cooperative antagonists, involve coercive
power in their mechanisms of decision. Yet they can and must be justified
deliberatively. Our ideal polity is diverse and plural. Its members both strive for
*This article was primarily written by Jane Mansbridge, drawing on ideas and concerns common
to the group of co-authors shared through meetings, conversation, correspondence, and (yes)
deliberation. It was revised on a rolling basis to incorporate the suggestions of co-authors. Although
each co-author would, if writing independently, put things in his or her own way, the paper represents
a direction of thought the co-authors collectively endorse. The process began at a Workshop on the
Role of Bargaining, Negotiation, Compromise, and Voting in Deliberative Democracy, following a
workshop in Granada organized by Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí (see Besson and Martí
2006). We thank the Ash Institute for Democratic Innovation at the Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University and the Safra Center for Ethics, also at the Kennedy School, for supporting
this deliberatively innovative workshop. We thank Bettina Scholz, who helped with the analytic
preparatory work and took notes during the proceedings. We particularly thank Semantha Besson,
Joshua Cohen, Philip Pettit, and Dennis Thompson for their participation in the workshop and
comments on the manuscript, and thank as well for their comments on the manuscript André
Bächtiger, Geoffrey Brennan, Mara Hernández Estrada, James Fishkin, Roberto Gargarella, Robert
Goodin, Faviola Rivera, Debra Satz, participants at a Stanford University workshop and participants
a seminar sponsored jointly by the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University.

The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 18, Number 1, 2010, pp. 64–100
© 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00344.x

the common good and, recognizing that diversity produces irresolvable conflicts
in opinions and interests, deliberatively authorize certain non-deliberative
democratic mechanisms.

II. FORMS OF DELIBERATION
Although deliberation might be defined broadly as “communication that induces
reflection on preferences, values and interests in a non-coercive fashion,”1
deliberative democracy involves a decision binding on the participants or those
for whom the participants are authorized to speak.2 There is considerable
consensus among theorists on many of the regulative ideals of deliberative
democracy.3 The deliberation should, ideally, be open to all those affected by
the decision.4 The participants should have equal opportunity to influence the
process, have equal resources, and be protected by basic rights. The process of
“reason-giving” is required and central.5 In that process, participants should

1 Adapted from Dryzek 2000, p. 76. For other definitions see also, inter alia: Gutmann and
Thompson 2004; Chambers 2003; Goodin 2008; Fishkin 2005; Stokes 1998; Przeworski 1998;
Knight and Johnson 1994; and Manin 2005.
2 On the requirement for the concept of deliberative democracy that it aim at a binding decision see
Gutmann and Thompson (1996), Thompson (2008) and others. Deliberation aimed at a binding
decision may produce a decision not to decide, in which case the status quo is binding. This article
does not discuss what some consider deliberation more broadly, which may take place outside the
forum of a binding decision in other arenas of the larger “deliberative system” (Mansbridge 1999) in
civil society, ideally producing mutual clarification and enlightenment that should then affect the
authoritative allocation of values either formally through authorized political bodies or informally
through social decision. See Fraser (1992) on “weak” (opinion-creating) and “strong” (binding)
public spheres and Habermas ([1992] 1996) on the two deliberative “tracks” of “opinion-formation”
in the larger public sphere and “will-formation” in the formal body that produces a binding decision.
For an alternate formulation see Bohman (1996; 1998; 1999). The article also does not discuss the
role that deliberation, hypothetical or actual, may play in anchoring or defining a philosophical
concept like “justice” (as in Lafont 2004). Our subject is the ideal to which actual political bodies,
trying to make a democratic decision binding on the members, should strive. Our use of the word
“deliberation” henceforth will refer, unless otherwise specified, to deliberation aimed at such a
binding decision.
3 We define a “regulative” ideal, unachievable in its full state, as an ideal to which, all else equal,
a practice should be judged as approaching more or less closely. See Kant ([1781] 1998, p. 552,
A569/B597; also A570/B598) on a “regulative principle” as a standard “with which we can compare
ourselves, judging ourselves and thereby improving ourselves, even though we can never reach the
standard.” For the “rationality of pursuing unattainable goals” see Rescher (1987, p. 114). See also:
Nozick 1989, ch. 24; Martí 2006a, pp. 24–31; and for a caveat Habermas [1990] 1993, p. 164. We
assume a plurality of regulative ideals that may sometimes conflict. An ideal may be unachievable in
its full state for practical reasons (e.g., the ideals of absence of coercive power or completely equal
power) or because in specific instances it conflicts with other ideals (e.g., the ideal of equality
sometimes conflicts with that of liberty). For reasons of “the second best,” it may in some instances
be appropriate to act contrary to the ideal (see below note 51 and accompanying text).
4 The question of what input into democratic decision on a policy affected parties outside the
deciding polity should have is currently highly contested. One possibility conceives of affected
non-citizens as having a right to some input into deliberation without the full panoply of deliberative
rights (e.g., the background equal resources) or the right to equal power in a non-consensual decision.
Unborn affected parties pose further questions. On this issue see, e.g.: Gould 2004; Dryzek 2006; and
Goodin 2007. This analysis is restricted to living adult members of the polity.
5 Thompson 2008, p. 498. As we point out below in section B, the concept of “reasons” in
“reason-giving” can include non-cognitive “considerations” that others can accept.
SELF-INTEREST & POWER IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 65

treat one another with mutual respect and equal concern. They should listen to
one another and give reasons to one another that they think the others can
comprehend and accept. They should aim at finding fair terms of cooperation
among free and equal persons. They should speak truthfully. The criterion that
most clearly distinguishes deliberative from non-deliberative mechanisms within
democratic decision is that in the regulative ideal, coercive power should be
absent from the purely deliberative mechanisms. Participants should not try to
change others’ behavior through the threat of sanction or the use of force.
Within these criteria, democratic deliberation can take several forms: a) classic
deliberation, b) more recently expanded versions of the classic ideal, and c) the
newly reformulated ideal that we propose here. The new ideal includes four
forms of communicative agreement—convergence, incompletely theorized
agreements, integrative negotiations, and fully cooperative distributive
negotiations—that, while accommodating suitably constrained forms of
self-interest, derive from non-coercive processes.

A. CLASSIC DELIBERATION
The classic ideal of deliberation, we believe, is insufficient for a polity ideally
based on diversity in opinions and interests. In the classic ideal, individuals enter
a deliberation with conflicting opinions about what is good for the polity, but
after voicing and hearing the reasons for different options, converge on one
option as the best, for the same reasons. Ideally, the deliberation is based on
reason. It aims at consensus and the common good. In most formulations
it explicitly excludes negotiation and bargained compromise. It excludes
self-interest.
In the classic antithesis between deliberation and aggregation, the rejection of
self-interest is a central part of the larger rejection of aggregation, negotiation,
and interest-group pluralism.6 Iris Marion Young summarizes the classic contrast
between deliberative and “interest-based” models of democracy as follows:
“Democratic processes are oriented around discussing [the] common good rather
than competing for the promotion of the private good of each. Instead of
reasoning from the point of view of the private utility maximizer, through public

6 See Habermas (1989, p. 45) on the necessity of “overcoming” one’s “egocentric viewpoint.” For
the antithesis between deliberation and aggregation, see, e.g.: Habermas [1962] 1989 (reason versus
will), Elster 1986 (the forum versus the market); Michelman 1988 (strategic action versus
deliberation); Sunstein 1988 (rejecting the conception of the electoral process “as a self-interested
struggle”); Cohen 1989 (rejecting the aggregative model); Estlund 1993 (deliberative versus strategic
models); Cohen 1996 (deliberative politics versus a politics of bargaining); Martí 2006a, pp. 41–52,
2006b, p. 28 (deliberation versus bargaining and voting); and Mansbridge 1980 (unitary and
adversary democracy, for different contexts). See also: Manin 1987; Miller 1992, pp. 182–3;
Gutmann and Thompson 1996, pp. 1–4, and 2004, pp. 13–21; Knight and Johnson 1994; Bohman
1998; Johnson 1998. Fishkin (2005) notes that some versions of the antithesis confound contrasts
between methods of preference formation (deliberation versus raw preferences) and methods of
decision (consensus versus majority rule).
66 JANE MANSBRIDGE ET AL.

deliberation, citizens transform their preferences according to public-minded
ends, and reason together about the nature of those ends and the best means to
realize them.”7
Indeed, in Jürgen Habermas’s early work (and that of earlier scholars in this
tradition), public and legislative deliberation should ideally rest only on “the
standards of ‘reason’ ” and “the authority of the better argument” on matters of
“common concern.”8 This view is inseparable from a concept of “law as an
expression of reason,” in contrast to will.9 Laws ideally embody “the reasonable
consensus of publicly debating” persons, not a “compromise between competing
private interests.”10 This definition excludes from deliberation not only self-
interest but also all forms of negotiation.

B. EXPANSIONS OF THE CLASSIC IDEAL
Contemporary deliberative theorists have moved away from the language of
“reason,” with its Enlightenment overtones of a unitary and knowable entity,
to a focus on mutual justification. Participants in deliberation advance
“considerations” that others “can accept”—considerations that are
“compelling” and “persuasive” to others and that “can be justified to people
who reasonably disagree with them.”11 This criterion of “mutual justifiability”
has become central to the concept of deliberation.12
Other features of an expanded understanding of deliberation are more
contested. The term “mutual justifiability,” for example, opens the door to
storytelling and the non-cognitive evocation of meanings and symbols that can
appeal to actual or imagined shared experiences. Stories can establish credibility,
create empathy, and trigger a sense of injustice, all of which contribute directly or
indirectly to justification. Not all deliberative theorists have accepted storytelling
or other such methods as compatible with deliberative ideals, particularly
excluding from deliberation any form of “irrational” persuasion. Yet the stance
of mutual respect required for good deliberation almost always requires
extending toward the other participants an empathy that attends to
commonalities and differences. Acts of empathy, which require trying to put

7 Young 1996, pp. 120–1, citing earlier theorists.
8 Habermas [1962] 1989, pp. 28, 36, 37.
9 Habermas ([1962] 1989, p. 81), citing Schmitt ([1928] 1957, p. 148): the “law is not the will of
one or of many people, but something rational-universal; not voluntas, but ratio.”
10 Habermas [1962] 1989, p. 132; also p. 195. Schmitt also contrasts “discussion”—an
“exchange of opinion” on “the truth or justice of something,” characterized by “freedom from selfish
interests”—with “negotiation,” arguing that laws should “arise out of a conflict of opinions (not out
of a struggle of interests)” ([1926] 1988, pp. 4–6, parentheses in original). See also Arendt ([1963]
1965, pp. 272–3) and Mansbridge (1996) for critique. Martí (2006b, p. 28, n. 2) points out that many
theorists explicitly distinguish between deliberation and negotiation, including: Sunstein 1988; Cohen
1989, pp. 17–18; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, pp. 1–4; 2004; Bohman 1998, p. 400; Knight and
Johnson 1997; Barber 1984, pp. 136–7; and Pettit 2003, pp. 139–40; but cf. Bohman 1996, p. 282.
11 Cohen 1989, pp. 101–4; 1996, pp. 100, 2.
12 See Scanlon 1982; Gutmann and Thompson 1996 and 2004; Bohman 1998; Lafont 2006.
SELF-INTEREST & POWER IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 67

oneself in another’s place, usually engage the non-cognitive faculties and require
non-cognitive forms of communication. The role of these non-cognitive faculties
in deliberation is contested.13
The very goal of the common good admits of several meanings. The classic
ideal implied a relatively unitary conception, discoverable through reason.
Expanded theories point out that the giving of good reasons will not always,
even ideally, lead to a unique result. Thus expanded theories entertain plural
conceptions of the common good, ranging from agreement on the structure of
conflict to aggregative understandings of the common good. The definition and
meaning of the common good remains highly contested.14
Finally, when interests or values conflict irreconcilably,15 deliberation ideally
ends not in consensus but in a clarification of conflict and structuring of
disagreement, which sets the stage for a decision by non-deliberative methods,
such as aggregation or negotiation among cooperative antagonists. We assume
that the goal at the outset of deliberation ought not necessarily to be a substantive
consensus. Indeed, when the more powerful actors have previously unequally

13 Sanders (1997) and Young (1996) favor storytelling on the grounds that disadvantaged
participants are more likely to use this form and use it successfully (per contra, Benhabib 1996, p. 83).
See Bohman (1996, esp. pp. 7 and 45), Dryzek (2000, pp. 64–70), Chambers (2003, p. 322) and
Thompson (2008, p. 503) for an expansive construal of reason-giving, and Krause (2008), Hall
(2007) and Nino (1996, pp. 124 ff.) for emotional communication in deliberation. Galinsky, Ku and
Wang (2005) advance experimental evidence that cognitive “perspective taking” may be more
effective than emotional empathy in producing joint gains in negotiation. The arguments in this essay
do not require a position on this point.
14 For analyses of different meanings of the common good, see Held (1970) and Mansbridge
(1998); for interests held qua member of the public see Barry (1965); for cooperatively avowable
considerations and common avowable interests see Pettit (2000; 2001b, esp. pp. 156–8). For the good
of agreement on the structure of conflict, see Miller (1992), List (2003) and Pettit (2006, p. 99) (for
critique, see McGann 2006, pp. 130 ff.); and for an empirical demonstration that deliberation can
structure preferences in a more single-peaked fashion appropriate for majority voting, see List et al.
(2006). For an aggregative understanding, see Steiner et al. (2004). An aggregative understanding of
the common good (the common good in an aggregative form), as in utilitarianism, differs from
aggregation through a decision procedure like majority rule, which we do not conceptualize as “the
common good.” (We thank James Fishkin for noting the possible confusion.)
15 We use the word “interest” here to mean an “enlightened” preference, that is, what
hypothetically one would conclude after ideal deliberation was one’s own good or one’s policy
preference, including other-regarding and ideal-regarding commitments. Any guess as to what such a
conclusion would be is necessarily open to further thought, testing through practice, and political
struggle. The word “interest” connotes objective, static or eternal states discoverable through
revolutionary action or through reason, and revealed by removing the sources of oppression or
repression. We want to discard these connotations, while retaining some distinction between surface
preferences, opinions, or prereflective understandings, and understandings of self and commitments
that are more considered, emotionally and rationally, and more thoroughly tested in action. Using this
definition, transforming one’s “interests” requires transforming one’s self, including one’s identity, in
contrast to transforming only one’s preferences or one’s perceptions of one’s interests (see note 40
below). In this sentence we use the phrase “interests or values” not to imply that interests cannot
include values but to clarify to the casual reader, who might not use the word “interests” inclusively,
that we intend both material and less tangible interests, including other-regarding and ideal-regarding
interests. When we specify “self-interest,” however, we exclude other-regarding and ideal-regarding
interests, except in the important cases when a representative is arguing against the interests of others
for the “self”-interest of a constituency or an individual for the “self”-interest of her family or other
subgroup with which she is deeply identified. (We thank Amy Gutmann for comments leading to this
clarification.)
68 JANE MANSBRIDGE ET AL.

influenced the definition of the situation and its appropriate norms, deliberation
ought to make less powerful actors more aware of their interests and, when
interests conflict, increase their perception of the conflict.16 Deliberation that
has clarified and structured conflict well appropriately ends with majority rule
or other non-deliberative democratic methods such as negotiation among
cooperative antagonists.
In all deliberative theories, disagreement, conflict, arguing, and the
confrontation of reasons pro and con are crucial to the process.17 Deliberative
democrats have always placed a high value on contestation. Conflict in opinion
was the very stuff of politics in the classic theory of Jürgen Habermas, for
example. It is not conflict per se but the conflict of self-interests that for such
theorists contaminated the “political.” We argue, by contrast, in a further
expansion of the deliberative ideal, that any ideal of the political, of legitimate
democracy, and of deliberative democracy must include self-interest and conflicts
among interests in order to recognize and celebrate in the ideal itself the diversity
of free and equal human beings.

C. D ELIBERATIVE NEGOTIATION
As we incorporate both self-interest and conflicts of interest (including material
self-interest) in the deliberative ideal, we deploy the classic distinction between
coercive and non-coercive interactions to draw an analytic line not, as in classic
theory, between deliberation and negotiation, but between two categories
of negotiation: the non-coercive forms of negotiation, which we consider
deliberative, and those forms that in one or another way intrinsically employ
power in the decision process itself and are thus not deliberative. Non-coercive
forms of negotiation, based on mutual justification, fit solidly within our
reformulation of the deliberative democratic ideal. We distinguish such
deliberative negotiations both from forms of democratic negotiation that permit
some forms of threat and from the mechanisms of democratic aggregation such
as majority rule whose legitimacy is based at least in part on the equal power
ideally inherent in each vote. We also argue later, however, that certain
non-deliberative forms and mechanisms that intrinsically employ coercive power
are legitimate and necessary procedures of democracy more broadly conceived

16 Others who have criticized the classic ideal for over-emphasizing consensus include: Knight and
Johnson 1997; Przeworski 1998; Shapiro 1999, p. 31; Bell 1999; Besson 2005, pp. 228–33; and
Thompson 2008. Bachrach (1974) early argued that when underlying conflict has previously been
obscured (usually by the hegemony of the more powerful), participation in politics should increase
conflict.
17 For recent treatments of conflict in deliberation, see: Thompson 2008; Gutmann and Thompson
1996; Bohman 1996; Estlund 2001; and Manin 2005. Chambers (2003, p. 321, citations omitted)
concludes that deliberative theory is now “more sensitive to pluralism” and “has moved away from
a consensus-centered teleology—contestation and indeed the agonistic side of democracy now have
their place.”
SELF-INTEREST & POWER IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 69

to the degree that they and their procedures emerge from and withstand
deliberative, mutually-justificatory, scrutiny.
Four forms of communicative agreement that we consider non-coercive
and thus part of “deliberative” democracy—the processes of convergence,
incompletely theorized agreements, integrative negotiation, and fully cooperative
distributive negotiation—all incorporate self-interest without deviating from the
criteria for good deliberation. Each of these processes ends in a kind of consensus,
that is, a genuine agreement among participants that the outcomes are right or
fair.18 Each contrasts, however, with classic deliberative theory, in which
participants enter a deliberation with conflicting opinions on the common good,
but after hearing others’ judgments and reasons, adopt one understanding or
option as the best, for the same reasons.
In what we call convergence, deliberation concludes with participants agreeing
on a single outcome for the same reasons, but begins without significant conflicts
of opinion or interest. Although the participants enter the deliberation with
interests or opinions on what is good for the polity that do not greatly diverge,
these opinions are often not fully formed or known to one another. The
participants bring together facts and insights from their various sources of
information, and after deliberation converge on one option as the best for all. The
participants need to consider what information and interests each brings to the
table and sort out what they think is best by talking with and listening carefully
to one another. They need to reflect together, perhaps in depth, on their mutual
preferences, values and interests. Moments of convergence, frequent in most
political bodies, may engage self-interests that turn out to be compatible, similar
opinions on the common good, or both. Deliberation to convergence often
generates mutual respect, trust, collective agency, satisfaction, and goodwill. It
forges bonds on the basis of common insight and common action. Defining
politics to require conflict and relegating moments of convergence to the category
of “administration” denies the complexity of political processes, which properly
include convergence without significant conflict on a common good.19
Incompletely theorized agreements originate with conflicting opinions on
the common good and conclude with participants agreeing on a single outcome,
but for different reasons. Cass Sunstein formulated this concept to describe and
commend many decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court, but rightly claims that it
applies to other deliberations as well. He argues that because incompletely
theorized agreements rest on participants’ different reasons, such agreements are
more likely than fully theorized ones to preserve openness for future evolution,

18 Earlier theorists have also suggested that in some circumstances deliberative democracy
appropriately includes some form of negotiation and compromise on matters of self-interest; see, e.g.,
Habermas ([1992] 1996), Gutmann and Thompson (1996, esp. pp. 69–73, permitting bargaining
constrained by moral reciprocity), and Bohman (1996, esp. p. 91). For more on deliberative and
non-deliberative negotiations, see Mansbridge (2009).
19 Per contra see, e.g., Barber 1984, p. 129.
70 JANE MANSBRIDGE ET AL.

allow effective decisions in limited time, accommodate the limited human
capacity for reason-giving, and encourage the humility and mutual respect
required in plural societies.20 Incompletely theorized agreements do not fulfill
the demands of the criterion of mutual justification “all the way down.” By
definition such agreements leave certain issues unresolved. But in deliberating
to an incompletely theorized agreement, the parties offer mutually acceptable
justifications regarding outcomes and sometimes even regarding the midlevel
principles (such as precedent) that generate those outcomes. One metaprinciple
that might generate such agreement is precisely that of leaving ultimate principles
unresolved. To the degree that the parties can genuinely offer one another such
justifications, based not only on the need to find a modus vivendi but on mutual
respect for the other’s premises, the process of generating incompletely theorized
agreements meets the deliberative criteria of mutual justification, mutual respect,
reciprocity, fairness, equality among participants, and the absence of coercive
power.
Integrated solutions, or “win-win” solutions based on integrative negotiation,
are also forms of coordination that originate with conflict and conclude with
agreement on one outcome but for different reasons. Unlike incompletely
theorized agreements, they were originally conceived to deal explicitly with
differences in self-interest, including material interest. In Mary Parker Follett’s
original example of an integrated solution, she wanted the window in a library
shut to avoid a draft while another patron wanted it open to get more air in the
room. Her solution, opening the window in the next room, gave both parties
what they wanted.21 Integrated solutions are possible only when the parties have
different valuations of the different aspects of the negotiation and can discover a
way of exploiting those different valuations for joint gain. Because in the end the
parties have no need to compromise, integrated solutions might be said to
“dissolve” a conflict or show that a perceived conflict was only apparent. Yet the
parties involved do want different things, which at the origin of the deliberative
negotiation seemed to present a conflict. They do not agree on an outcome for the
same reasons. Only through deliberation, weighing, and exploring their mutual
and conflicting interests can they discover how to resolve the apparent conflict by
expanding the borders of the problem or introducing new perspectives.
Finally, in fully cooperative distributive negotiations (henceforth simply “fully
cooperative negotiations”) participants enter a deliberation with conflicting
interests, but, after deliberating on the content of those interests and on the
principles of fairness appropriate to adjudicating them, adopt a distributive

20 Sunstein 1995; see also Sunstein 1996, pp. 35–61; 1997; 1999. Bohman also argues for
deliberative agreement on the basis of “different publicly accessible reasons” (1996, p. 83, also p. 92,
emphasis in the original; but see Pettit 2003 for caveats). By contrast, Habermas requires that the
process of producing a “rationally motivated consensus” exclude the different parties accepting the
result “each for his own different reasons” ([1992] 1996, p. 166, emphasis in original).
21 Follett ([1925] 1942), originating the idea of integrated solutions/integrative negotiation.
SELF-INTEREST & POWER IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 71

agreement that all consider fair. Distributive negotiations differ from integrative
negotiations in having zero-sum outcomes.22 That is, although the parties reach
an agreement that is better for each than the status quo or the other alternatives
available, they give up some part of what they want to get agreement. Coining the
term “fully cooperative” negotiation to contrast with “cooperative antagonist”
negotiation, the far more common form of negotiation and the subject of his
classic text, Howard Raiffa wrote that the partners in a fully cooperative
negotiation:
have different needs, values, and opinions, but they are completely open with one
another; they expect total honesty, full disclosure, no strategic posturing. They think
of themselves as a cohesive entity and they sincerely want to do what’s right for
that entity. This would be true, for instance, of a happily married couple or some
fortunate business partners.23
Unlike most negotiations (those among cooperative antagonists), fully
cooperative negotiations meet the criteria for deliberation. In the regulative ideal,
they are conducted among participants of equal status and resources, who treat
one another with mutual respect and concern, listen carefully to one another,
speak truthfully, and aim at finding fair terms of cooperation. Fully cooperative
negotiations rest solely on mutual justification. Whereas in other distributive
negotiations the parties implicitly or explicitly exchange not only promises but
threats (particularly each party’s threat of withdrawing from the potential
agreement), in the ideal of fully cooperative negotiation each party eschews not
only the threat of leaving but also other forms of coercive power.

III. SELF-INTEREST
Although judges and administrators should recuse themselves if they have
self-interests in a matter they must decide for others, in politics participants make
decisions not only for others but also for themselves. Those who know their
interests best, namely (in general) those whose interests they are, need to
deliberate with others about those interests, come to understand them, express
them, and stand up for them. Even in a deliberation aimed at consensus on the
common good, the exploration and clarification of self-interests must play a
role.24 Including self-interest in deliberative democracy reduces the possibility of

22 Walton and McKersie ([1965] 1991, pp. 4–5) introduced the terms “integrative bargaining” and
“distributive bargaining” to distinguish between 1) the system of activities that is “instrumental to the
attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental conflict with those of the other party” and 2)
the “system of activities instrumental to the attainment of one party’s goals when they are in basic
conflict with those of the other party.” We use the term “zero-sum” colloquially to include what strict
game-theorists would call “constant-sum” and “zero-sum” games, in both of which my gain requires
your loss. (Thanks to Joseph Mazor for this point.)
23 Raiffa 1982, p. 18. Raiffa wrote no more than this paragraph on this subject; we have fleshed
out the concept as a component of the deliberative democratic ideal.
24 Several theorists have made a role for self-interest and conflicting interests in their
understandings of deliberation: Benhabib 1996, p. 73; Dryzek 1990, p. 43; Mansbridge 1996; 2002;
72 JANE MANSBRIDGE ET AL.

exploitation and obfuscation, introduces information that facilitates reasonable
solutions and the identification of integrative outcomes, and also motivates
vigorous and creative deliberation.25 Including self-interest in the regulative ideal
of deliberative democracy embraces the diversity of human objectives as well as
the diversity of human opinions.
Self-interest plays an important role in deliberation in two ways: relatively
uncontroversially, as information on the common good or conflict, and, more
controversially, as justifiably constitutive of an aggregative common good or
conflict.
First, even in classic deliberation, where participants try to understand what
policy best promotes the common good, self-interested statements serve as
information regarding that common good.26 The deliberation preceding a
decision helps to clarify interests and preferences in addition to transforming
them. In this process of clarification, participants in the deliberation must be able
to explore what they really want and what is right for them as well as for others
in a way that does not take self-interest off the table. A participant should be able
to come to a realization of self-interest, saying, “But that policy would hurt me
[or my constituents],” and hear from others that other policies will hurt or help
them. 27 If self-interest is not part of the process of exploration and clarification,
the chances increase greatly of a group’s adopting a version of the common good
that does not take everyone’s interests into account. If members of the group can
speak only as “we” and not as “I,” neither they nor the other participants may
be able to discover what is really at stake and forge integrated solutions.28 In
2006; Sanders 1997, p. 353; Young 1996, p. 126; and Bohman 1996, p. 255, n. 15. In Chambers’
(2003, p. 309) conception of deliberation, “participants are expected to pursue their interests.”
Johnson (1998, p. 174) concludes that “a plausible argument for deliberation must not—in the effort
to differentiate deliberation from bargaining—categorically exclude either self-interested claims or the
conflicts that such claims might generate from the range of admissible topics that participants to
deliberation might address.”

25 Fung even argues that “hot deliberations with participants who have much at stake make for
better deliberation,” because “participants will invest more of their psychic energy and resources into
the process and so make it more thorough and creative” (2003, p. 345, emphasis in original).
26 Cohen and Rogers (2003, p. 247) write: “Deliberation does not preclude statements of
self-interest. The deliberative view . . . admits [expressions of self-interest] as ways to present
information. For example, a relevant consideration in deliberation, and a possible justification or
reason for a policy, is that it represents a fair accommodation of the interests of all, or advances the
good of those who are in greatest need. But to know that it does either of these things, we need to
know what those interests are, and expressions of self-interest by relevant persons are one way to find
that out.” In the omitted ellipsis, however, Cohen and Rogers argue that “expressions of self-interest
do not qualify as justifications for anything—as statements of reasons in the desired sense” (emphases
in original). We argue below that within certain constraints such expressions can qualify as
justifications.
27 Pettit (2006, p. 100) argues that interventions such as “That’s going to make life difficult for
those of us who are [group characteristic]”, are “likely to be accepted as relevant on all sides” in a
deliberation and to “secure acceptance as reasonable.” See also Goodin 1996, p. 341.
28 Per contra, Benjamin Barber (1984, p. 200) articulated the classic position against expressing or
pursuing self-interest: “In place of ‘I want Y,’ the strong democrat must say ‘Y will be good for us.’ ”
Jon Elster also reported that “There are certain arguments that simply cannot be stated publicly. In
a political debate it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be chosen just
because it is good for oneself. By the very act of engaging in a public debate—by arguing rather than
SELF-INTEREST & POWER IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 73

 

practice, without this exploration of self-interest, the understandings of the
common good of the more powerful in the polity may dominate, even without ill
will or the intent to exercise power.
For example, one evening in 1965, forty-six faculty members at the University
of Michigan who wanted to protest the Vietnam War met until four AM to decide
between two proposals: a day-long anti-war moratorium with faculty calling
off their classes, which would break the faculty members’ contracts with the
university, or an alternative new idea of a 24-hour session on the war with no
cancelled classes. A young assistant professor eventually said, “I’m in favor of the
alternative but it’s not because I think it is more or less effective as a protest
against the Vietnam War. It’s because I’m scared. I’m afraid of losing my job. I
could repeat some of the arguments for switching that others have given, but
that’s not the real reason.”29 A majority emerged for the alternative proposal,
the disappointed pledged their support, and the “teach-in” was born. Teach-ins
spread rapidly across the universities in America, at least in part because that
solution accommodated self-interests that a more restrictive interpretation of a
deliberatively justified argument would have excluded from the discussion.
In this case, the deliberation had been framed to decide which strategy was the
most effective protest. The decision was supposed to be not about what was best
for “us,” the deciding group, but what was best for the anti-war cause. The
young assistant professor, trying to maintain authenticity but undoubtedly also
worrying that the remark showed him insufficiently committed to the cause,
offered his self-interest as information about himself, not as a justification. Yet
that information turned out to be highly relevant, as what was best for the
anti-war cause turned out to include the cost of anti-war activity for potential
participants.
bargaining—one has ruled out the possibility of invoking such reasons” (Elster 1986, pp. 112–3,
citing Midgaard 1980). Gutmann and Thompson (1996, p. 126) respond with an example from the
U.S. Senate floor showing that in fact such claims are “pragmatically possible.” Elster later gave the
label, “the civilizing force of hypocrisy,” to the pressure of the norms by which “even self-interested
speakers are forced or induced to argue in terms of the public interest” (1995, p. 251, our emphasis;
also 1998, pp. 13, 111). Other theorists have used language close to Elster’s (but perhaps admitting
of self-interest constrained by fairness). See, e.g., Hannah Pitkin (1981, p. 347, citing Tussman 1960):
“[In public life] we are there forced to acknowledge the power of others and appeal to their standard,
even as we try to get them to acknowledge our power and standard. We are forced to find or create
a common language. . . . We are forced, as Joseph Tussman has put it, to transform ‘I want’ into ‘I am
entitled to,’ a claim that becomes negotiable by public standards.” See Benhabib (1996, pp. 71–72,
citing Arendt 1961): public deliberation “forces the individual to think of what would count as a
good reason for all others involved. One is thus forced to think from the standpoint of all
involved. . . . a standpoint that Hannah Arendt, following Kant, had called the ‘enlarged mentality.’ ”
Finally, see Young (1996, p. 128): “Knowledge that I am in a situation of collective problem solving
with others who have different perspectives . . . cultures and values from my own . . . forces me to
transform my expressions of self-interest and desire into appeals to justice.” (Emphases ours
throughout.) To the degree that this force derives from social pressure, as in Elster’s claim for the
civilizing force of hypocrisy, it can undermine the deliberative ideal, reducing both authenticity and
information.

29 Gamson 1991, pp. 31–2.
74 JANE MANSBRIDGE ET AL.

A second, more contested claim is that when the common good is composed
of individual goods, each individual’s self-interest is a constituent part of that
common good. In this case, the presentation of one’s self-interest is in itself a
justification, a reason in itself for adopting a particular policy. In a highly
simplified and completely aggregative case, the members of the polity could
deliberate about their interests, explore their options together, flesh out the
implications of different choices, contemplate the different forms of common
good applicable to the problem, realize that the appropriate form in this case was
purely aggregative, and all individually announce what they had concluded was
good for them from the perspective of their own self-interest, saying, “This policy
is in my (my group’s) interest.”30 If all the participants, perhaps for different
reasons, converge on one policy as in their self-interest, then that policy, formed
by the aggregation of those interests, is for them the common good in an
aggregative form. In these circumstances, for each individual and for the others
in the group, the fact of self-interest is a reasonable and sufficient justification
of the individual’s stance.
One purpose of deliberation should be to clarify conflict as well as
commonality, sometimes leading to the conclusion that the issue cannot be
handled with deliberative processes alone. If, after deliberatively exploring both
the common good and individual interests, participants find that either their
understandings of the common good or their more self-regarding interests cannot
be reconciled, they need to recognize this fact and authorize another form of
decision-making, perhaps a form of voting, to produce a relatively legitimate
decision. In this situation too the simple fact of one’s self-interest may constitute
a justification to others for desiring one policy, resisting another policy, and
coming to the conclusion of irreconcilable conflict.
Finally, as explained earlier, the statement and pursuit of self-interest is in
many cases necessary to construct a fair and fully cooperative negotiation,
whether integrative or distributive.
The claim that may be hard for deliberative theorists to swallow is that
self-interests are intrinsically self-justifying, under certain constraints, in those
forms of democratic deliberation and decision that construct a common good
from particular conflicting interests (including some incompletely theorized
agreements, most integrative solutions, and most fully cooperative negotiations).
Indeed, because a composite common good is made up of individual goods,
which can include material self-interests, those interests have a self-evident,
primordial claim to be counted in that common good.

30 See per contra Cohen and Rogers (2003, p. 247), arguing that “This policy is in my (group’s)
interest” exemplifies a statement that cannot be a justification; also Nino (1996, p. 122), arguing that
the “mere expression of wants or description of interests,” such as “This is what I want,” “would be
rejected as arguments in any genuine discussion.” We consider it legitimate for a participant to begin
a deliberation, perhaps to convergence, by saying invitationally, “This is in my self-interest; is it in any
of yours?”
SELF-INTEREST & POWER IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 75

Consider an example in which two individuals have conflicting interests. One
member of a married couple has a job offer in Chicago and the other an offer in
Boston. It would distort their communication and decision-making to “force”
them to discuss the issues solely in terms of what is good for “us,” e.g., for the
“marriage” or for the children. Only by recognizing their self-interests and the
conflict between them can the couple negotiate a fair, perhaps even integrative,
agreement. In the good that they forge through their deliberative negotiation,
their self-interested claims are intrinsically justifiable, that is, self-justifying in the
absence of negating considerations. If in the Teach-In example the group had
been making a decision about what was good for “us” rather than for the
anti-war protest, it should by right have considered the young participant’s
interests simply on the grounds that they were good for him and (like the married
couple’s interests in their careers) worthy of being counted in the decision on that
basis.
In the ideal of deliberative democracy, the expression and pursuit of
self-interest must be curtailed both by the universal constraints of moral behavior
and human rights and by the particularly deliberative constraints of mutual
respect, equality, reciprocity, fairness and mutual justification.31 Thus many
forms of self-interest are ruled out, not as desires but as justifications. “The
desire to be wealthier come what may,” for example, is in most instances not
compatible with mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, fairness and mutual
justification. But the “desire to be as wealthy as possible consistent with a fair
level that others (i.e. equal citizens) find acceptable” is compatible with the values
that help constitute the deliberative ideal.32 As we deliberate on a collective
course of action, I may justifiably claim that this desire of mine be given its proper
weight, perhaps an equal weight with others’ conflicting desires, without its
requiring any further justification.
To understand how self-interest might be inherently justified and legitimately
act as a justification in deliberation yet be curtailed by certain constraints, we
adapt words that John Rawls used in a different context when he identified
citizens as “self-authenticating sources of valid claims,” meaning that citizens are
“entitled to make claims on their institutions so as to advance their conceptions

31 Some logical circularity may arise in contending, as we do, that the very meaning of moral
behavior, human rights, mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, fairness, and mutual justification must
be established, albeit temporarily and contingently, by deliberation that is itself constrained by these
values. (E.g., concepts of fairness must be deliberated in as close as possible to ideal conditions, as
dominant concepts of fairness are usually biased against subordinate interests and perspectives.) Yet,
because the kind of deliberation to a binding decision that involves self-interest as a justification and
not just as information appears at a stage at which both the philosophical deliberations and the
foundational binding decisions on these matters have already occurred either explicitly or implicitly
(see below), the possible philosophical circularity involved in establishing the meaning of these
constraints need not affect our more narrow analysis of the role of self-interest.
32 This modification of Cohen’s (1989, p. 24) original contrast with a justifiable “desire to have a
level of wealth that is consistent with a level that others (i.e., equal citizens) find acceptable” permits
as justifiable the more self-interested desire for as much wealth “as possible” within constraints. It
also adds fairness to acceptability.
76 JANE MANSBRIDGE ET AL.

of the good (provided these conceptions fall within the range permitted by the
conception of justice). These claims . . . [have] weight on their own apart from
being derived from duties and obligations specified by the political conception of
justice, for example, from duties and obligations owed to society.”33 In a similar
way, we argue, citizens are entitled to make claims on their institutions to
advance their interests (provided these interests fall within the range permitted
by the broad constraints of human rights and morality and the deliberative
constraints that run from mutual respect through mutual justification). These
claims of deliberatively constrained self-interest have weight on their own, and do
not need to be derived from a larger deontological or consequentialist theory.34
The kinds of deliberation in which the regulative ideal allows participants to
advance their particular self-interests are themselves constrained. Democratic
deliberations ending in a binding decision over basic, unrenounceable and
generalizable interests such as human rights ought to include statements of
self-interest only as information. Most democratic deliberations to a binding
decision do not, however, involve such basic constitutive decisions. Broadly
speaking, the question of which kinds of claim are appropriate in any
deliberation must itself be subject to deliberation and mutual justification. When
the young anti-war faculty member advanced his self-interested reason for
pursuing the less personally costly strategy, the group could have deliberated
upon the appropriateness of that reason. Instead, it implicitly accepted the
relevance of his reason to the common task. Although there was no actual
deliberation on that relevance, his claim was at least potentially open to a process
of mutual justification.
We have used the word “fair” rather than “impartial” to describe the ideal
process in deliberative negotiation because we contend that to participate
appropriately in integrative and fully cooperative negotiations the participants
often should at one and the same time both try to conceive and follow a goal of
fairness, a process that may require an impartial or third person perspective, and
also stand up for their own self-interests. The participants thus need to be
partisan or partial in identifying their own interests and promoting them.

35 But
33 Rawls 1993, p. 32.
34 Indeed, both deontological and consequentialist ideals presuppose the intrinsic justifiability of an
individual’s self-interests. In the deontological ideal of equal respect, those interests are part of what
we ought to respect. In utilitarianism, if we should count each for one and none for more than one
(a standard formulation that has, however, not been traced to the specific words of Bentham or Mill),
those interests are part of what we should count. Rawls made self-interests part of his conception of
“primary goods” (1971, p. 93), concluding that “merely reasonable agents would have no ends of
their own they wanted to advance by fair cooperation” (1993, p. 52). Habermas also argued that a
norm is valid if all affected can accept the consequences it can be anticipated to have “for the
satisfaction of everyone’s interests” ([1983] 1990, p. 65), admitting expressly that there therefore is
“a remnant of the good at the core of the right” ([1996] 1998, p. 29). (Thanks to Sharon Krause for
these citations.)
35 Textbooks on negotiation often warn that friends and other individuals who want to do right by
their communal entity may fail to pursue their self-interests fully enough to realize the gains that can
be achieved in negotiation because their concern for the relationship is so great that they hesitate to
cause conflict (e.g., Thompson 2005, p. 143).
SELF-INTEREST & POWER IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 77

they should also want to reach an accommodation that is fair, be willing and
able to justify their self-interests to others in terms of fairness, understand the
arguments from fairness from the other side, and look for fair adjudications
among competing understandings of fairness. While they should seek impartial
outcomes in the sense of outcomes that do not benefit one side or another
unfairly, it is both permissible and in some institutional instances required that
they take particular concern for their own interests. Participants need not be fully
neutral or detached in the deliberative process.36
Will legitimating self-interest, even in constrained form, undermine the
capacity of the democratic deliberative ideal to inspire transformations in the
direction of the common good? In practice, perhaps yes. Many normative
theorists have emphasized the power of deliberation to transform individual
participants’ perceptions and even identities in the direction of the common
good.37 Deliberation would have no point if it did not produce change in the
views of at least some participants, if only a change in the strength and conviction
with which those participants held an unchanged opinion. When participants
change their minds in deliberation, as in practice they often do, they most
frequently do so because they have acquired new factual information.38 They
sometimes change their minds because they have detected logical mistakes in
their reasoning, or developed new perspectives on the information they have,
for example, taking a more long-range view. We consider deliberation
“transformative,” in the sense of transforming self-interest, not in these instances
but rather when participants change their minds because they have adopted to
some degree the perspective of another or taken the other’s interests as their own.
(This might be the case, for example, when a predominantly male faculty, or one
whose members are mostly past the age of childrearing, decides to hold faculty

36 This point opens up a complex discussion that cannot be explored further here. Nagel’s (1986;
1991) and others’ works on impartiality have sparked an immense literature pro and con (see also,
e.g., Williams 1973; 1981). Our point here differs from Nagel’s (1991) argument that workable
institutions have to find some way of incorporating both impartial ideals and some (not necessarily
dominant) self-interested motivations. We argue that in deliberative democracy partiality, suitably
constrained, should be part of the constellation of values within the ideal itself. In the past some
normative deliberative theorists have made impartiality a criterion for good deliberation (e.g., Nino
1996, Estlund 1993 with caveats in n. 61), while others have used as a criterion such terms as
“generality” and “generalization” (Manin 1987) or “a general point of view” (Pettit 2003). Some
have explicitly distinguished from impartiality their criteria of reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson
1996, pp. 59–63, and 2004, pp. 152–3), publicity (Bohman 1996, pp. 40–46, 80–88), or universalism
(Sunstein 1988, p. 1574 n. 195). For Habermas the concept of impartiality understood as neutral
detachment is appropriate for “discourses of application,” when judges or others like them decide
specific cases on the basis of already justified norms, but not for “discourses of justification,” through
which the universal validity of norms is earlier determined and in which each discourse participant
should take the internal perspective of the affected others (which is incompatible with adopting a
third person perspective); see Habermas [1991] 1993, pp. 35–38, 48–50 and Günther 1993.
37 E.g., Barber 1984; Elster 1986; Warren 1992; Mansbridge 1980 and 1992; Chambers 1996. For
skepticism, see Knight and Johnson 1994, pp. 282 ff.
38 Goodin and Niemeyer 2003; see also Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell 2003. The new information
could include, e.g., relevant circumstances not previously considered, relevant interests previously
neglected, consequences not previously analyzed, and options not previously contemplated.
78 JANE MANSBRIDGE ET AL.

meetings at a time that makes it possible for one of their number, with a child in
daycare, to pick that child up on time.) In another form of such transformation,
participants may change their minds because the deliberation has evoked and
strengthened perceptions of, and a commitment to, justice, which now
overrides or modifies the self-interested perspective with which they entered
the deliberation. They may even forge new understandings of justice in the
deliberation. Or participants may be transformed in this way because the
deliberation has evoked and strengthened ties to a communal entity to which
they had given less weight before deliberation and that now overrides or modifies
their original self-interested perspective. They may also help create, as they
deliberate, the entity that now claims their allegiance.39 When deliberation
actually goes so far as to transform an individual’s identity—a relatively rare
occurrence—we can say that deliberation has transformed not only that
individual’s preferences but his or her interests.40 When before the deliberation
real underlying conflicts were obscured, any transformations of preferences
and even identities/interests should ideally create or increase conflict.
Transformations of preferences, and even on rare occasions transformations
of underlying identities, in the direction of a common good can be among the
most valuable features of deliberation. To insist on a role for self-interest in
deliberation is not to deny that value. The problem in practice is, as Archon Fung
points out, “Discussions aimed at fostering and clarifying individual preferences,
for example, by airing conflicts and advocating conflicting principles,”
particularly if they encourage the exploration of self-interest as well as common
interest, may render “participants less flexible and more self-interested,” thus less
open to transformation.41 It is admittedly not easy to explore commonalities
collectively, remain open to transformation, and forge a common good while at
the same time exploring and keeping an appropriate grasp on one’s own

39 The value of these transformations must be judged not only by the quality of the procedures that
produce them but also by external criteria regarding, for example, the value of the entity or common
good that claims the participants’ allegiance. Transformative processes may lead participants to
choose a policy that is good for them or their newly adopted objects of concern but bad for others.
40 Most transformations of identities (and therefore interests) will be caused not by discussion
with others but by changes in objective circumstances, as when one becomes a parent. Some
transformations in identities can be caused by combinations of words and actions, as when a
combination of cognitive conclusions about justice and bonding through common action transforms
one into an activist willing to give much, perhaps even her life, for the cause. Words alone (at least
performative words) can on occasion accomplish such transformations of identities and interests, as
when some French nobles on the night of August 4, 1789 entered the National Assembly as relatively
self-interested beings and left committed to ending feudal privileges. Such relatively instantaneous
transformations of identities may require a combination of cognition (e.g., specifying what justice
demands in a given instance) and emotional exhortation (e.g., to identify with the parts of oneself that
are willing to do what justice demands and disown the parts not committed to that goal). Over time,
however, transformations of identities (and therefore interests) could take place through primarily
cognitive considerations, as when a person already committed to justice assimilates new facts and
insights about the content of justice and thereby takes on a new identity (e.g., as a feminist).
41 Fung 2003, pp. 348–9. See also Thompson (2008) on the “internal conflicts problem” and Lax
and Sebenius (1986) on the “negotiator’s dilemma.”
SELF-INTEREST & POWER IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 79

self-interest and potential conflicting interests. But the task is neither impossible
nor a contradiction in terms. It is, in fact, the ideal.

IV. THE USE OF POWER

A. IS POWER ANTITHETICAL TO DELIBERATION ?
In all of the deliberative forms of decision-making specified above, power—in the
sense of coercive power—is ideally absent.42 Because, as Foucault points out,
every human being is constituted by power relations, including coercive power
relations, and at the same time exercises coercive power over others, the absence
of coercive power is a regulative ideal, impossible to achieve but serving in many
circumstances as a standard against which to measure practice.43
We understand power in general as A’s preferences or interests causing (or
changing the probability of) outcomes, and coercive power as A’s preferences or
interests causing B to do (or changing the probability that B will do) what B
would not otherwise have done through the threat of sanction or the use of
force.44 Coercive power arises only when the preferences or interests of A and B
conflict. Of the two forms of coercive power, the threat of sanction and the use
of force, only the threat of sanction engages the will of the coerced. If I threaten
you with a sanction (“Leave this room or I’ll shoot you”), you can always accept
the sanction and deprive me of what I want. You will your action, although you
do not prefer it and it is not in your interests. Force differs from the threat of
sanction in not engaging the will of the coerced. When I use force, I achieve my
goal without a choice on your part (I carry you out of the room, kicking and
screaming). Because force works against your interest without engaging your
choice, it includes any structuring of alternatives that, unknown to you, is
detrimental to your interests.

42 In Habermas’s ([1962] 1989, p. 202) formulations, both early and late, ideal deliberation
embodies “the power-free flow of communication.” Congruently, our reformulation of the regulative
deliberative ideal involves the absence of coercive power within the process of decision, although not
in its implementation. Even an ideally deliberated and fully consensual decision might require
coercion in its implementation (see below).
43 Some of the mystique of Foucault’s analysis derives from conflating power as capacity with
power as coercion. This analysis focuses only on power as coercion. For Foucault’s understanding of
power, see Fraser ([1981] 1989) and McCarthy (1990). See note 51 and accompanying text for the
“second best” point that in non-ideal circumstances it may be wrong to try to approach an ideal as
closely as possible.
44 More strictly, we define power in general as “the actual or potential causal relation between the
preferences or interests of an actor or set of actors and the outcome itself,” a formulation adapted (by
adding the words in italics) from Nagel’s (1975) definition, which improves on those of Weber and
Dahl by including anticipated reactions and not requiring intent. We thank Philip Pettit for suggesting
“changing the probability” of outcomes. The categories of the threat of sanction and use of force
derive from Bachrach and Baratz (1963). Our definition of coercive power applies only in situations
of conflicting interests (see Lukes 1974) and corresponds with Pettit’s (2001b, pp. 72 ff.) “hostile
coercion.” Coercive power may act subtly and without active interference (see Pettit 2001b on
domination). We do not mean by unequal power the unequal capacity to persuade when interests do
not conflict (see, e.g., Lukes 1974; Knight and Johnson 1997).
80 JANE MANSBRIDGE ET AL.

The power that is antithetical to deliberation is not power in general, which
could include the simple capacity to act, but coercive power, defined as the threat
of sanction or the use of force against the others’ interests. Lying is a form of
coercive power.45 A’s lying leads B to act, without B’s willing it, against B’s own
interests in ways that B would otherwise not act.
In normal conditions, occupying the status quo gives one power through both
the threat of sanction and the use of force, because established institutions and
their accompanying social settings facilitate what everyone has always done,
making actions that depart from this pattern subject to automatic and even
unintended social and institutional sanctions. Those institutions and settings also
propel participants in certain directions whether or not anyone is conscious of
this propulsion or knows what the costs to different participants will be. The
coercive power of the status quo becomes normatively problematic when it
promotes the interests of one individual or group against the interests of another.
In the deliberative ideal, including the ideal instantiated in a fully cooperative
negotiation, coercive power should have no effect. In this ideal, even the status
quo should have no weight other than through persuasion on its merits (for
example, in an argument that if something has worked up till now, it will
probably work in the future).

46
45 On deceit as coercion, see: Bok 1978, p. 18; Warren 2006, p. 166. We recognize that the word
“force” (from Bachrach and Baratz 1963) has physical and violent connotations that we reject. In
addition, we do not use “force” (a form of coercive power) for actions that structure alternatives in
ways congruent with the other’s interests, although we recognize that what is and is not congruent
with a person’s interests will always be highly contested. We avoid the word “strategic,” because it
can mean both 1) actions that merely take account of the potential reactions of other actors, a neutral
usage that describes much ideal deliberation (see Johnson 1991), and 2) actions such as manipulating
an agenda, withholding information, and misrepresenting facts or perceptions, which (except in
paternalism) arise only when interests conflict, involve forms of coercive power, and are antithetical
to deliberation. We thus do not describe as deliberation the kinds of interaction analyzed in
Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006).
46 Inducements pose a problem as yet unresolved in the theory of power. Many discussions of
power (e.g., Bachrach and Baratz 1963) define coercion, as we have, to include threats of sanction and
the use of force against an individual’s interests but not to include inducements that enhance those
interests. Most ordinary language speakers also call threats of sanction and the use of force
“coercive,” in part because in general coercion involves a deprivation of freedom, and freedom is
often defined by reference to the status quo. (I “freely” choose to improve my lot in response to a
promise, but am “coerced” when my lot is worsened in response to a threat.) From an economic
perspective, the distinction is nonsense. From a psychological perspective, the distinction has more
bite, because losses often decrease happiness more than gains increase it (Bentham [1789] 1961, p.
290; Kahneman and Tversky 1979). From a philosophical perspective that tries to capture, rationalize
and improve normative intuitions, the status of inducements remains unclear (cf. Nozick 1972 on
coercion; Barry [1979] 1991 on inducements). Classic deliberative theorists, rejecting bargains and
negotiation as part of deliberation, bundle together both “threats and promises” (e.g., Habermas
[1996] 1998, p. 166; Martí 2006a, pp. 41–52; also Elster 1995; Føllesdal 2006b). To correspond with
common intuitions, we have singled out “coercive power” as antithetical to deliberation and define
coercive power as the threat of sanction or use of force. Yet inducements may also be antithetical to
ideal deliberation, particularly when, for example, they come in currencies from inappropriate
spheres (Walzer 1983). Proposals for positive measures designed to achieve an integrated solution or
produce a fair outcome are not properly inducements, just as predictions and warnings are not threats
(see Elster 1995 for the distinction between offers/predictions and promises/threats), although that
distinction is not always easy to draw in practice.
SELF-INTEREST & POWER IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 81

We grant that the ideal of fully absent coercive power (henceforth simply
“power”) is not only impossible to achieve but even hard to envision. We are all
the products of power relations and exercise power by our very presence in the
world. Yet in practice human beings can recognize a rough spectrum that runs
from a minimal to a far greater role for power. The regulative ideal of absent
power in deliberative interactions prescribes reducing to a practical minimum the
threat of sanction and the use of force against another’s interests.

B. POWER IN FACILITATING STRUCTURES
The closer an actual deliberation comes to the ideal, the less the threat of sanction
and the use of force should prevail. In practice, some coercive power is often
needed in a deliberation simply to keep order. A moderator’s keeping a list of
those who wish to speak, helping to cluster together comments on a particular
topic, curtailing long-winded speakers, or making space for those who have not
yet spoken threatens sanctions against those who want to speak right then and as
long as they want, but this coercion, fairly exercised, promotes the purposes of
deliberation. In a context of preexisting inequality, some coercive power may also
be necessary to maintain basic rights, equal opportunity, and the other conditions
that help participants approach the deliberative ideal. In a metadeliberation over
the conditions of deliberation free and equal participants would be likely to
adopt these mutually justifiable rules not only as a guard against others but also
to curtail their own future weaknesses of the will.

C. POWER VERSUS POWER
A more seemingly discordant use of power consonant with deliberation arises in
attempts to achieve balance when one party in a negotiation has more power
resources than the other party and intends to use those resources to achieve her
ends against the other’s interests or in other ways to depart from the deliberative
ideal. In cases like these, it is morally acceptable for the other party also to
exercise power or consonantly depart from the deliberative ideal.
Two arguments excuse these departures. The first, closer to the deliberative
ideal, aims at creating the conditions for good deliberation. If in a two-party
interaction one party has greater power than the other, the less powerful party
may appropriately increase its power to equal the first in order to neutralize the
first, thus producing as close as possible an approximation to the ideal of no
power in the deliberation.47 A deliberative democrat might, for example, justify

47 David Estlund (2006, p. 87) gives the following example: “If you put a gun to my head, and I
put a gun to your head in reply, your use of power has been (at least to some extent) countervailed,
in the sense that its ability to skew the deliberations has been scaled back by my response. Still, the
power-free ideal of the ideal speech situation . . . has not been restored.” This logic may lie behind the
82 JANE MANSBRIDGE ET AL.

strikes or the threat of strikes on these equalizing or neutralizing grounds.48 Any
use of power to create the conditions for listening in situations of impeding
inequality would also qualify.
The second argument is simply one of self-defense. Deliberative democrats
should not be expected to cleave to the norms of deliberation when opposing
parties do not meet those norms.49 From the perspective of self-defense,
derogations from the deliberative norm are authorized to the degree of the other’s
derogation.50 More broadly, Jon Elster underscores “the harm that can be done
by unilateral attempts to act morally” and enunciates the theory of the “second
best,” pointing out that “When others act non-morally, there may be an
obligation to deviate not only from what they do, but also from the behavior that
would have been optimal if adopted by everybody.”51 In practice, self-serving bias
often leads participants somewhat to overestimate the amount they must do to
redress a balance, thereby encouraging escalation.52

D. POWER IN IMPLEMENTATION
After the decision, whether a group has deliberated to genuine consensus in a
setting relatively free from power or made its decision through forms of
democracy that involve power, the decision will still often have to be
implemented through coercive power. Collective action problems must often be
solved by participants agreeing to impose some form of coercion on those
(including themselves) who, after the agreement, would otherwise rationally be
tempted to defect.53 We assume that democracies will often need to use coercive
power (in addition to deliberative processes) in implementing legislative
decisions no matter how closely the process of decision approached the
deliberative ideal.
requirement in some negotiations that each party (e.g., labor and business) have an equal number of
representatives, even though the number of individuals that, say, labor represents is presumably much
greater than the number business represents. This neutralizing strategy works only in two-party
situations.

48 Lani Guinier (1992, pp. 288–92) similarly argues that minority representatives should occupy
crucial strategic locations in a legislature to insure that the process is responsive to their views.
49 Estlund 1993, p. 1474; see also Estlund 2006, pp. 81–7; Gutmann and Thompson 1996,
pp. 72–3, and also p. 90; Young 2001.
50 See Fung (2005) on the criteria of fidelity, charity, exhaustion, and proportionality.
51 Elster (1986, pp. 116, 119) (emphasis in original), drawing on a line of thought begun by Lipsey
and Lancaster (1956–57). E.g., in a collective action problem one might have in general a duty to
cooperate, but if the other defects one might have a duty to defect in a tit-for-tat response that might
induce the other to cooperate in the future. See also Goodin 1995.
52 Babcock and Loewenstein 1997. Negotiating parties indulge in, for example, strategic
misrepresentation in part because they expect that others will do so and they need to equalize the
balance (Shell 2000; Meltsner and Schrag 1974; Freund 1992). Machiavelli ([1513] 1950, p. 64) too
advised princes that “as [others] are bad, and would not observe their faith with you, so you are not
bound to keep faith with them.”
53 Olson 1965; Hardin 1982; Grofman and Feld 1988.